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Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and
is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be
implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that
quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open-economy macro-policies,
in particular, the impositionlremoval of capital controls, and financial repression. We first derive
a model that delivers such a result. Bureaucratic corruption translates into reduced ability by the
government to collect tax revenue. Even if capital controllfinancial repression is otherwise
inefficient, as long as the government needs the revenue for public goods provision, it would have
to rely more on capital control/financial repression. For all countries for which we can obtain
relevant data, we find that more corrupt countries are indeed more likely to impose capital controls,
a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. The result of this paper suggests that a premature
removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce rather than enhance
economic efficiency.
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Quality of bureaucracy varies widely across countries. In this paper, we examine its
implications for open-economy macro policies. Specifically, we focus our discussion on the
imposition of capital controls and financial repression as an example.
Capital controls and financial repression in developing countries were once considered a
severe hindrance to economic development (McKinnon, 1973; and Shaw, 1973). Recently, in
the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, there is an interesting twist in the intellectual
wisdom. Most economists now say that capital account liberalization without aproper domestic
financial supervisory and regulatory structure in place is a recipe for financial disasters. Several
prominent economists go one more step, arguing that the benefits of capital account
liberalization are probably negligible (e.g., Rodrik, 1999), or that restrictions on capital
movement can serve useful policy functions if one believes that international portfolio flows and
short term credits are excessively volatile (Wyplosz, 1986; Rodrik, 1999; Rodrik and Velasco,
1999).
We choose to look at capital controls/financial repression from a different angle, namely,
bureaucratic quality as a potential determinant. An important but sometime less appreciated fact
is that quality of bureaucracy evolves slowly relative to the speed with which a government can
implement many economic policies, such as to impose or remove capital controls. Widespread
bureaucratic corruption in a country results in a loss in the ability by the government to collect
fiscal revenues from the formal tax channel. Or more precisely, the marginal cost of collecting
tax revenues rises with the level of corruption. As a consequence, to finance the provision of
public goods, it would have to rely increasingly more on the otherwise inefficient capital control
/financial repression. In this case, a premature removal of capital controls (such as whatmay be
mandated by the International Monetary Fund) could reduce rather than enhance economic
efficiency. This is a separate point from the possibility that a premature removal of capital
controls may increase the likelihood of a financial crisis.
There are two relevant strands of the literature. First, a number of papers have examined
the consequences or determinants of bureaucratic corruption, including Rose-Ackerman (1978),
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1997 and 1999), and Wei3
(1997)1. Second, there are also a humber ofpapers that have examined consequences or
determinants of capital controls, including Alesina and Tabellini(1989), Epstein and Schor
(1992), Dellas and Stoclcman (1993), Dooley and Isard (1980), Lane andRojas-Suarez (1992),
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez(l 993), Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferrettj(1994), Aizenman and
Guidotti (1994), Bartolini and Drazer (1997), and Grilli and Miles-Ferretfi(1995).
As far as we know, none of the previouspapers has directly looked at the connection
between corruption and capital controls. Of course, thosepapers that emphasize the public
finance motivation for capital controls are direct predecessors to thispaper. Our contribution is
to argue (and to provide the first model and first piece of evidence) that bureaucraticcorruption
may be the underlying reason for the difficulty in tax collection and in turn for the greater
reliance on capital controls.
It is possible that the existence of capital controls breeds corruptionas firms/individuals
find it necessary to pay bribes in order to circumvent the control. Indeed,we need to take into
account this possibility when we turn to the empiridal examination. The central focus of this
paper is on the reverse question: how the imposition and severity of capital controls are affected
by the extent of corruption in the country. In other words, we take the extent of bureaucratic
corruption as an exogenous "state of nature," in the sense that it is part of the public institutional
infrastructure that is slow to evolve. More precisely, a government ortop political leader is
assumed to be able to impose/remove capital control or change its severity muchmore swiftly
than she can with the extent of bureaucratic corruption in the country2.
While we use the term "bureaucratic corruption" in thepaper, we actually have in mind
various dimensions of the quality of bureaucracy, includinggovernment efficiency and burden of
regulation, and not just bribe-taking by officials. Unfortunately, there does not existseparate
data that allows us to measure separately the different dimensions of bureaucraticquality. What
we can feasibly gather are measures of bureaucratic corruption based on the perceptions of
experts, firm managers or citizens. Our suspicion is that the different dimensions of bureaucratic
quality are highly correlated. Nonetheless, it is useful to keep this broad perspective in mind in
interpreting our results.
See Pardhan (1997) and Wei (2000) for a more complete review of the literature.
2Apossible extension of the model is to allow corruption and capital controls (or policy distortions in general) to
influence each other, possibly leading to multiple equilibria.4
Ourpaper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents a model that formalizes
our story. Section 3 describes the data that are used in the empiricalanalysis. Section 4 reports
the empirical evidence on our hypothesis. Finally, section 5concludes.
2. A Theoretical Model
In this section, we present a theoretical model in whichcapital control is endogenously
determined by the government in a way that is related to the level ofcorruption in the country.
Our model assumes a welfare maximizing government (topleader) who collects revenue to
provide public goods, but our central story would go through if thetop leader simply collects
revenue for her private consumption.
2.1 Setup of the Model
We consider a model with a representative investor in the privatesector, a bureaucrat,
and a government. The representative private investor's utility increases with theamount of the
public good provided by the government, denoted by X, as well as his privateconsumption,




The investor is endowed with a fixed wealth "toOHisconsumption depends on tax T and
investment opportunities. We assume that he can invest his net wealth Y0—Tin a portfolio of
domestic and foreign assets. Denote the return to the domestic asset by Rd and that to theforeign
asset byThe two returns can be different for reasons we will discuss later. Suppose the
investor allocates a share of his net wealth to the foreign asset. Then hisconsumption will be
Y =(Y0-T)[aRf+(I-a)Rd]
For simplicity, let us say that both the domestic and foreign assets are risk free. In the
absence of capital controls, both are equal to the world interest rate, Rf Li =r*.Of course, in
this case, the representative domestic agent is indifferent between domestic andforeign assets,
and the optimal a is undetermined.5
In this model, we recognize that capital control isan instrument of financial repression.
It has two effects. First, because circumventing capital control iscostly, it reduces the rate of
return on investing aboard that is available to domestic investor,so that now R Cr*.Second,
because circumventing capital control runs the risk of beingcaught and punished, the effective
rate of return on the foreign asset faced by the domesticagent now becomes risky, and in
equilibrium would on average be somewhat higher than the domestic (still risk-free) interestrate,
E{Rf} >RTo be simple and concrete, we will assume (rather than derive)a specific functional
form linking the extent of capital control, denoted by k, and theequilibrium domestic and foreign
rates of return.
R4r*pk
R1 =rt-pk+ p1k + kv
where p is the effectiveness of capital control, v is a random variable witha normal distribution
N(O, a2) and represents the risk that capital control causes to investing in foreignassets, and p
indicates that capital control is less effective in depressing the return toforeign assets than to
domestic assets. Ideally, we should assume a distribution for the randomvariable, v, that is
bounded from above. For simplicity, we make it an unbounded normal variable.
The amount of public good provided by the government, X, dependson its available
resources, denoted by Z.
X=f(Z),
where f is an increasing and concave fl.mction.
The government raises tax T. Due to corruption, part of the tax revenue is stolenby the
bureaucrat. Suppose the bureaucrat's stealing is
S =S(T,0)
where 0 is a parameter representing the weakness ofgovernance, or the degree of corruption.
We assume that S is increasing in T and 0 respectively and is convex in T.Furthermore, 5T8 > 0.
In other words, as either the total amount of tax or corruption increases,stealing by bureaucrats
also increases. Furthermore, as either total tax or corruption increases,marginal stealing per unit
of tax collected also increases. In Appendix A, we offer a plausible justification for these
assumptions. We label the fraction of formal taxes that disappears as "stealing" by the
corruption-prone bureaucrats. Alternatively, we could also interpret it as "waste" ofgovernment
resources by the inefficient and corrupt bureaucrats.6
Thegovernment's total usable fiscal resources, Z, consist of two components: an explicit
tax revenue net of stealing (or waste), and an implicit tax revenue derived from financial
repression. One possible example of implicit revenue is the saving by the government in its cost
of borrowing from the domestic capital market when the domestic interest rate is artificially
suppressed to below the world interest rate3. We assume that the implicit revenue from the
financial depression depends on the reduction in domestic interest rate as a result of capital
controls, pk, and the total amount of domestic savings, (Yo —T).Then,
Z =[T
—S(T,)] + [4pk(Yo —T)]
In Appendix C, we employ an alternative assumption in which the implicit tax revenue is
$pk(l-a)(Yo —T).In other words, it depends only on the amount of domestic savings that is not
invested aboard. We show that while this complicates the mathematical derivations, the basic
qualitative conclusion of the model is still the same.
We consider a sequential game in which the government moves first, choosing explicit
tax T and the degree of capital control k to maximize the social welfare, taking as given the
weakness of the public institution (i.e. the extent of corruption), the bureaucrat's stealing
flmction, and the private investor's reaction function. The representative private investor moves
next, choosing an optimal allocation between capital flight and domestic investment, taking into
account the tax and capital control. We solve the game with backward induction.
2.2 The Private Investor's Decision
Given his portfolio choice a, the private investor's consumption is
Y=(Yo_T)(r*pk+aptk+akv).





ishis certainty equivalent consumption level. Then, an expected utility maximizing investor
should choose a to maximize CE. The first-order condition for a is
One could alsothink ofseigniorage revenue as another source of implicit revenue. Giovannini and de Melo (1993)
madea conceptual distinction betweenfinancial repression and seigniorage, but also showed that the two are
positively correlated across countries.7
(Y0 — T)p - Sczk2(Y0— = 0
and the optimal choice of a is
=
[kp1J/ [6k2c2(Yo —T)j=pt/[6ka2(Y0—T)j.
a* is the proportion of after tax wealth invested inforeign assets, or the extent of capital flight.
The above equation implies that capital flight decreases with the risk ofthe flight, k2a2 and with
the rate of risk aversion, 6, but increases with the premium ofinvesting aboard, kpr






The government chooses k and T to maximize the aboveutility level of the representative
private investor, or equivalently, the governnent maximizes
Ug(k, T) =yf[T
—S(T,0) +$pk(Y0—T)]+ — T)(r*-pk)+
Lemma1: Suppose *"<1and Gis not too smalL Then, the optimal T is determined by
Si(T,8)=1Ør* (1)
and the optimal k is determined by
T— S'T 9)çbp/q'Yo
—T)=QJ'[8/(y4)]. (2)
Proof:The government's objective fUnction U5 is not necessarilyconcave in T. Therefore, it is
not clear whether or not the first order conditions of the optimization problemare sufficient. To
circumvent this problem, we maximize the objective function in twosteps.










Then, the government's problem becomes to maximizeUg subject to the above first-order
condition for k; that is,















By the assumption that 5(1, 0) is convex in I, the reduced form ofUg is concave in T. Then the
optimal Tisdetermined by the first-order condition that
Ug'(T) =6r*+ - 3ST(T,0)/i =0,
or
ST(T, 0) =1-r*. Q.ED.
Remark 1: If$ is so large that 1 -$r*<0, or in other words, if financial repression isvery
effective at raising revenue for the government, the optimal T =0.To see this, note that U5'(T) <
Ofor all I if I -r*<Q
Remark 2: Suppose 1 -4r*>0.If corruption is negligible arid hence stealing by the bureaucrat
is negligible, then it is optimal not to haveany capital control. Specifically, ff0 is so small that
ST(T, 9) <1-r*for all T C'0, thenUg(T) >0for all I CY0and it is optimal to choose las
large as is necessary to fulfill the need for public good provision and to choose k 0.
The lemma implies that both direct taxation and capital controlare used for the
government to obtain resources to finance public good provision. The intuitive reason for this
mixture to be optimal is as follows. The stealing function 5(1, 0) isconvex in T. Therefore, the
marginal cost of T increases. On the other hand, the marginal cost of capital control—depressed
return to investment —isa constant. Then, the marginal cost of T is higher than that of k when T
is too high, and is lower when T is too low. As a result,only part of the expenditure for public
good provision should be financed by direct taxation T.9
2.4. Comparative Statics
Proposition 1: The optimal capital control k increases with the level of bureaucraticcorruption
6whilethe optimal tax collection T decreases with the corruption level 8.
The proofs for this proposition and the next are provided in Appendix B. The results in
Proposition I are not difficult to understand intuitively. As corruption increases, more tax
revenue will be stolen, then it is more desirable to finance the public good by capital
controllfmancial repression rather than by direct taxation.
Proposition 2: (z) The optimal tax T is independent of the degree of risk aversionp but the
optimal capital control k decreases with p. (ii) The optimal tax T decreases with 0butthe
relationship between the optimal k and 0isambiguous. (iii) The optimal T is independent of r
andc5 but the optimal k increases with yand decreases with c5, where 7is the importance of the
public good in the representative private investor s' utility while S is that ofprivate consumption.
(iv) The optimal T and k are both independent of pj and ci.
Intuitively, as p increases, the returns to investment decrease, and the government
resources from capital control increase, at the same proportion. This implies that the level of
public good provision and T should not change. With the increase in the government's ability to
extract resources from capital control, there is less need for the control in order to obtain the
given level of resources for public good provision; that is the optimal Ic decreases. This is the
reason for part (i) of Proposition 2.
The intuition for (ii) is as follows. As $increases,the government can get more resources
from capital control and therefore has less need for direct taxation, resulting in lower T. The
increase in has two effects on k. The positive one (similar to the substitution effect) is that
more resources should be extracted from capital control and the negative one (similar to the
income effect) is that less control is needed in order to extract a given level of resources. It is not
clear which one of these effects dominate.10
Asthe public good becomes more important to the investor'sutility relative to private
consumption, i.e., asy increases or S decreases, the benefit of capital control—increasingthe
resources available for public provision —becomeslarger and the cost of capital control —
decreasingthe returns to private investment —becomessmaller. Therefore, k should increase.
The effect of y and S on T is not so straightforward. When thepublic good becomes more
important, it seems that more tax should be levied to increase public goodprovision. A larger T,
however, reduces the opportunity for the government to obtainresources from capital control,
thus reducing public good provision. The two effects of Thappen to cancel with each other in
this model. As a result, the optimal T is independent ofy and S. This is the reason for (iii).
To understand (iv), note that Pr and a2 enter into thegovernment's objective ifinction
Ug(k, T) only through a term that is independent of k and T. Therefore, the marginal effects of k
and T on Ug(k, T) are independent of Pr and a2. Consequently, theoptimal k and T are both
independent of p and a2
3. Data
The detailed definition and source for the data as well as theirmanipulation are explained
in Appendix D. Here, we provide a brief description on the mostimportant variables in our
empirical analysis.
3.1 Capital Control
Our capital controls are derived from the annual issues of the IMF's. Thereare five
categories of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions that the JMF has consistently coded
throughout our sample, 1984-1997. They are (1) existence of multiple exchange rates, (2)
payment arrears and bilateral payments arrangement, (3) controls on payments for invisible
transactions and current transfers, (4) controls on proceeds from exports and/or invisible
transactions, and finally, (5)controlson capital account transactions. For each category, the IMF
source indicates whether the country has restriction or not.
We derive a discreet-valued measure of the severity of capital control byaggregating the
five categories. Thus, the measure can take one of the six values fromzero to five, with zero ifII
thecountry has no controls in any of the five categories, and five if it has controls in all five
categories. The exact definitions of the six categories provided in Appendix B.
3.2 Bureaucratic Corruption
We use four different measures of corruption: ICRG, OCR, WDR, and TI indexes. In
addition, we use two variables as instrumental variables for corruption: legal corruption and
democracy.
(A) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Index.
Produced every year since 1982 by Political Risk Services, a private international
investment risk service. The ICRO corruption index is apparently based on the opinion of
experts and supposed to capture the extent to which "high government officials are likely to
demand special payments" and to which "illegal payments are generally expected throughout
lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import andexport licenses,
exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans."
(B) Global Competitiveness Report (GCR Index
Unlike the ICRO indices, the OCR Index is based on a 1996 survey of firmmanagers,
rather than experts or consultants. Sponsored by the World Economic Forum (WEF), a Europe-
based consortium with a large membership of firms, and designed by the Harvard Institute for
International. Development (FIIID), this survey asked the responding firms about various aspects
of "competitiveness" in the host countries where they invest.2381 firms in 58 countries
answered the question on corruption which asked the respondent to rate the level of corruption
on a one-to-seven scale according to the extent of "irregular, additional payments connected with
import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police
protection or loan applications." The OCR corruption index for a particular country is the
average of all respondents' ratings for that country.
(C) World Development Report (WDR) Index
Similar to the OCR Index, the WDR index is based on a 1996 survey of firms conducted
by the World Bank for its 1997 World Development Report. Every respondent was asked a long12
listof questions, one of which was on perceived level ofcorruption. The question is essentially
identical to the one in the OCRsurvey. The WDR survey covers over 70 or so countries (many
of which are not in the WDR sample, and thereverse is also true). The WDR survey tend to
cover more medium and small firms whereas the OCRsurvey had more large firms.
(D) Transparency International (TI) Index
Produced annually since 1995 by Transparency International,an international non-
governmental organization dedicated to fight corruption worldwide, the index isbased on a
weighted average of approximately ten surveys of varyingcoverage. It ranks countries on a one-
to-ten scale.
As a survey of surveys, the TI index has itsadvantages and disadvantages. If the
measurement errors in different surveys are independent and identically distributed(lid), the
averaging process used to produce the TI index may reduce themeasurement error. But iid
assumption may not hold. Moreover, since different surveys cover different subsets ofcountries,
the averaging process may introduce new measurementerrors when cross-country rankings are
produced. One should also note that, as the TI indexes in differentyears are derived from
potentially different set of surveys, they should not be used to measure changes incorruption
level over time for a particular country.
B. First IV for Corruption: Democracy
The measure of democracy is derived by addingup an index for civil liberties and
another for political rights, both are composed by the Freedom House. Liberties indexmeasures
the extent to which people are able toexpress their opinion openly without fears of reprisals and
are protected in doing so by an independent judiciary. Though this index reflects rights toorganize
and demonstrate as well as freedom of religion, education, travel and otherpersonal rights; more
weight was given to those liberties that are most directly related to the expression ofpolitical
rights. This variable is an index and not in logs.
Political rights index measures rights to participate meaningfully in thepolitical process on
a scale of one to seven where lower numbers indicate greater political rights (see Gastil,1989). A
high ranking country must have a fully operating electoral procedure, usually includinga
significant opposition vote. It is likely to have bad a recent change of government fromone party13
to another, an absence of foreign domination, decentralized politicalpower and a consensus that
allows all segments of the population somepower. The index was constructed on the basis of
satisfaction of the above and other related criteria by the countries inquestion. This variable is an
index and not in logs.
Both Index range from 1 to 7. Smaller number means higher degree of freedom.
Democracy is defined as (7-civ)+(7-pol).
F. Second IV Variable for Bureaucratic Corruption: Corruption in the JudicialSystem
Corruption in a country's judicial system is based on the same OCRsurvey that produced
the OCR bureaucratic corruption measure. Question 8.09 in thesurvey asked the respondents to
rate the level of corruption in the judicial system based on the extent towhich"[i]rregular
payments to judges or other officials involved in the enforcement and execution ofjudgements
are not common and do not influence the outcome of court proceedings" (lstronglydisagree,
7=strongly agree). We rescaled the index (7 -originalscore) so that a larger number means more
corrupt judicial system.
Tables la and lb report summary statistics for the key variables and theirpairwise
correlations.
4. Statistical Analysis
Since our measure of capital controls can take seven discrete values froma minimum of
zero to a maximum of five, we employ an ordered Probit specification:
Capital Control in Countryj =k
if Dk< y.* ￿Dk+[
where Yj*= eCoptio+x+ej
k =0,1,2,..., 5; D0 =-. andD6 = D1 D5 are parameters to be estimated together with
scalar B and vector f3; X is a vector of control variables other than corruption; andej is an
independently and identically distributed normal variate with a zero mean.14
Table2 presents simple regressions of the measure ofcapital control severity on
corruption and a dummy indicating membership in OECD. OECDmembership in recent years
often requires capital account liberalization (whichwas the case when Mexico and Korea
obtained their membership in 1994 and 1996,respectively). The first four columns use four
different measures of corruption: TI, OCR, WDR andICRG, respectively. In each of these
regressions, the extent of capital controls is positively related to the countries'perceived level of
corruption.
By using the ICRU corruption measure over 1982-96, we couldimplement a quasi-fixed
effects panel regression where year and region dummiesare included as additional regressors.
The result is reported in Column 5.Thecoefficient on the ICRO-corruption measure is smaller
than the corresponding one in the cross-sectionregression in Column 4. But it remains positive
and significant at the ten percent level, again consistent with thehypothesis that capital controls
are more likely in more corrupt countries.
One may be concerned that the four measures of corruptionso far can be tainted by
reverse causality. More precisely, since illegallirregular payments made to circumventexchange
controls are part of the criteria used to assess the degree ofcorruption, in a very direct sense,
countries with a more severe capital controls would also be ratedas having more corruption. To
deal with this, we employ an instrumental variable approaáh with variablesthat are related with
the extent of corruption in a country but arguably notdirectly a consequence of capital controls.
Two such variables are considered. The first is a measure ofcorruption in a country's judicial
system. When a country's legal system is corrupt, officials who ethbezzlegovernment tax
revenues or otherwise corrupt are less likely to be punished. The second variable isa measure of
the degree of democracy (civil liberties and political rights).Democracy enhances
accountability. Lack of democracy breeds corruption and embezzlement. Neither legal
corruption nor democracy is likely to be directly influenced by the imposition or severity of
capital controls.
In the last column of Table 2, we use these two variables as instruments for the OCR-
corruption measure. As we can see, the point estimate on corruption is somewhat smaller than
the corresponding regression without the IVs (column 2in Table 2).However, the coefficient
remains positive and statistically significant. So this is stronger evidence thatmore corrupt
countries are more likely to impose capital controls.15
InTable 3, we add three regional dummies to the regression (in addition to the OECD
membership dummy). Sub-Sahara African countries always have a positive sign in all six
regressions (indicating atendencyto have more severe capital controls), whereas East Asian and
Latin American countries mostly have a negative sign (indicating a tendency to have less
controls). However, for each regional dummy, the coefficient is often insignificantly different
from zero in many specifications. For our purpose, the most important observation is that the
coefficient on corruption remains positive in all specifications and significant in five out of six
specifications (including one in which corruption is instrumented by legal corruption and
democracy).
Grilli and Miles-Ferretti (1995) and Miles-Ferretti (1998) have argued thatgovernment
consumption-to-GDF ratio and government debt-to-GDP ratio are proxies for a government's
preference for spending. This could be perfectly consistent with our theoretical model: other
things constant, if the goverliment prefers to spend more money, it would want to collect more
revenues both from the formal tax channel and simultaneously from the financial repression
channel with tightened capital controls4. In addition to the government's preference for
spending, these authors also propose proxies for the (marginal) cost of capital controls. In
particular, they, argue that an independent central bank makes it difficult for the government to
rely on senioiriage revenue, and hence reduces its incentive to impose capital controls.
Following Cukieman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), they use an index of legal independence of
central banks and a count of average annual turnover rate of the central bank governors as two
measures of central bank independence. Related to this, the rate of inflation can be a more direct
measure of the degree of fmancial reptession the government is willing to exercise. These
authors argue ifirther that a government is less likely to impose capital controls if it has been
experiencing a current account deficit.
It is useful to note that, while these variables were used by these authors in their
regressions, one could argue that most of them are also related to the underlying corruption in a
country in a way that is consistent with our model. For example, rather than viewing central
bank independence as exogenous, a corrupt country may be more inclined to choose a non-zero
inflation rate and at the same time not to have an independent central bank5.
In our. model, the equilibrium capital control, k, rises with an increase in the relative importance of the public
goods in the government's objective ftrnction, y/ö. See Proposition 2 in the model section.
See Huang andWei(2000) for a model and some evidence.16
In any case, as a robustness check,we include these variables in our specificationas
additional regressors. The resultsare reported in Table 4. Since the number ofcountries that
have non-missing values for these variablesis small (among those countries that alsohave
corruption measures), we have between 23-30 observationsin the current regressions, less than
half than the corresponding regressions inTables 2 and 3. In the first three columnsof Table 4,
where a different measure of corruption isused in each column, we see that there issome
evidence that countries with highgovernment consumption-toGDP ratios also tend toimpose
capital controls. However, there is no systematicsupport in our regressions that current account
deficit, high inflation, and high government debt-to-GDPratios tend to be associated withmore
severe capital controls (once corruption and other variablesare taken into account). In fact, the
signs on the coefficients for inflation and
government debt are negative. Importantly, even in
this very small sample, corruptionmeasure continues to exhibit a positive andstatistically
significant sign.
With the ICRG measures of corruption,we experiment with two versions of panel
regressions. The first is a quasi-fixed effects regression in whichregional dummies in addition to
year durnnies are included. The second is a random-effectsregression in which random country
effects in addition to year dummiesare included. In the first panel regression, there issome
support for a positive association between inflation andcapital controls. In both regressions,
corruption continues to enter positively and significantly.
Finally, we use the extent of legal corruption and thedegree of democracy as instruments
for general corruption (the last twocolumns), we find that the coefficients oncorruption are
positive and statistically significant. Therefore,even in a small sample such as this and with
more control variables, there is robust evidence thatmore corrupt countries are more likely to
impose capital controls.
Since 1997, the IMF's Annual Reporton Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER) has given substantiallymore detailed information on a country's
restrictions on up to 50itemsof capital account transactions (andsimilarly detailed information
on restrictions on current account transactions). This inprinciple would enrich our analysis.
However, the tradeoff is that such detailed information isonly available for 41 countries, many
of which do not have data on corruptionratings. Given our already small number of countries in
the sample, this could be a significant cost.17
Inany case, we relate two separate measures of current account and capital account
restrictions based. on the detailed information to the measures ofcorruption in Tables 6 and 7.
The results are interesting. When the dependent variable is current accountrestrictions, the
coefficient for corruption is insignificant in four of five regression (Table6). However, when the
dependent variable is capital account restrictions, corruption has a positive and significant
coefficient in three out of five regressions including the one with instrumental variables(Table
7). To the extent that it is primarily the capital account restrictions rather than currentaccount
restrictions that help to generate financial repression in thecountry, these fmdings are also
consistent with our hypothesis.
As a cross-validation, we take a look at our hypothesis from a differentperspective. Our
central story in the model is a revenue loss mechanism: thegovernment has difficulty in
collecting revenue from the formal tax channels and hence has to rely more on capital controls
and financial repression. Therefore, one would think that if tax evasion ina country can be
measured, it should be positively correlated with corruption. In the Global Competitiveness
Report survey, respondents were asked to assess the extent of tax evasion in the country. Weuse
the mean response for each country as a (subjective) measure of the extent of tax evasion. In
Table 8, we regress tax evasion on corruption and statutory tax rate. We fmd that tax evasion is
more pervasive in a country with a higher tax rate and a high level of corruption, exactly as our
hypothesis would suggest.
5. Conclusion
This paper studies bureaucratic corruption as a determinant of capital controls. Inour model,
capital control is an instrument of fmancial repression. While it entails efficiency loss for the
economy, it also generates implicit revenue for the government. The more severe the
bureaucratic corruption in a country, the more difficult it is to collect formal taxes. As a result,
the government has to rely more on capital controls/financial repression. Incross-country
regressions, we find that more corrupt countries, measured by any of the four corruption indexes,
or instrumented by the degree of democracy and legal corruption in a country, do tend to impose
more severe capital controls.Is
If our story is true, then as countries graduallydevelop better public institutions along their
development trajectory, including reducing bureaucraticcorruption over time, they will choose
to gradually liberalize their capita! accounts. However,a premature removal of capital controls
forced upon by external organizations could reduceeconomic efficiency.19
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Appendix A: Justification of the Bureaucrat's Decision
In this appendix, we derive the properties of function S(T, 9) by considering the
bureaucrat's decision of choosing S. B is a measure of the extent of corruption or the weakness of
public institutions. To simpli& the derivation, we interpret 9 as a measure of the total
resources available for monitoring the bureaucrat. Suppose (GT)' units of resources are devoted
to the monitoring of each unit of tax revenue. Furthermore, the probability that the bureaucrat is
found stealing from any given unit of tax revenue is p(SIT)(BT)', where qiisa convex function
and SIT is the proportion of each unit of tax revenue being stolen. Finally, the penalty imposed
on the bureaucrat for being caught stealing from a unit of tax revenue is C. For each unit of tax
revenue, the bureaucrat steals SIT, and the expected cost (penalty) of his stealing is Cty(SIT)(OTy
Thenthe bureaucrat's total expected payoff is
T[SIT- Cw(SIT)(OT)1] = S - TCqx(SIT)(BTy'.
Supposethe bureaucrat chooses S to maximize the above expression. Then his optimal choice of
S is given by the first-order condition
1 —Cw'(SIT)(BTI'=0.
Consequently, the optimal S is
S =Tt(9TC'),
where t is the inverse function of qi'andis increasing. The derivative of S with respect to8 is
=Tr'(9TC')TC'> o.
The derivative of S with respect to T is
=t+ Tx'BC'> 0.
Differentiate the above expression and rearrange. Then,
=9C1t'(z)[2+ zt"(z)/t'(z)J,
where z =9TC'.Suppose function t satisfies the condition that
2 +zt"(z)/'r'(z)> 0, (4)
whichholds for t(z) =A(z+b)+ C1 and for t(z) =Ae'+ C2, for any A, B, b, C1, C2, and l>0.
Then, Sn> 0, i.e., S is convex in T. Similarly, we can prove that STe> 0 under condition (4).22
Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition I











Since S9 >0andT9C0,(3) implies
k8>0. QE.D
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) From equation (1),. 1 is independent of p. Then, equation (2) implies that pk is independent of
p. which in turn implies that Ic decreases with p.
(ii) Differentiating equation (1) with respect to $yields
=r*ISyr C 0.
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to 4andrearranging yield
4p(Yo -T)=-pk(Yo-T)-T(1-ST -$pk)-{ [(f)i'(6'$)}(S'$2).
Onthe right hand side, the first term is negative, the second term is positive as T <0and by the
proof of Proposition 1, and the third term is also positive because 1' is a decreasing fUnction.
Therefore, the sign of 1c whether the first term dominates, or is dominated by, the other two
terms.
(iii) By equation (1), T is independent of y and S. The right hand side of equation (2) increases
with y and decreases with S as f' is a decreasing function. Therefore, k increases with y and
decreases with S.23
(iv)Both equations (1) and (2) are independent of Pr and a2. Therefore, the optimal T and k are
both independent of p' and a2. Q.E.D.
Appendix C: Alternative Assumption on the Implicit Revenue from Financial Repression
In this appendix, we consider the alternative assumption that the implicit tax revenue
from financial repression is pk-a)(Yo-T). With this assumption, the amount of the
government's usable fiscal resources is
Z =[T
—S(T,B)][$pk(1-cz)(Y0-T)].









which differs from the value of Z under the original assumption about the implicit tax revenue
only by a constant term -4ppp'(3a2).Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that
Lemma 1': The optimal T is determined by
ST,6)=IØr* (1')
and the optimal k is determined by
T—S(T, 6) +qipk(Y0—T)(tJ'[S/frØ)] +Øpp/(Sd). (2')
Comparative Statics:
Proposition I is about comparative statics with respect to 0. Lemma 1' and Lemma 1
differ only by the term 4ppja2), which is independent of 9. Therefore, Proposition 1 continues
to holdunderthe alternative assumption about the implicit tax revenue.24
Parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of Proposition 2 remain the sane. However, the result about k in
part (iv) changes with the alternative assumption about the implicit tax revenue; previously, the
optimal k was independent of p' and a2, but under the alternative assumption, the optimal k
increases with p and decreases with a2. Specifically, we have
Proposition 2': (i)Theoptimal tax T is independent of the degree of risk aversion p but the
optimal capital control k decreases with p. (ii) The optimal tax T decreases with 0butthe
relationship between the optimal k and 0/s ambiguous. (iii) The optimal T is independent of r
and4butthe optimal k increases with yand decreases with 4whereyis the importance of the
public good in the representative private investor's utility while 5 is that ofprivate consumption.
(iv) The optimal T is independent of pjr and d.Theoptimal k increases with and decreases
with o.
The proof of Proposition 2' is similar to that of Proposition 2, except that for (i) is different. By
equation (1'), T is still independent of p. By equation (2'),
$p[k(Y0 —T)-pp'(3a2)j= Z -T+ S(T, 9).
On the left hand side
k(Y0 —T)-p/(6a2)= k(l-a*)(Yo —T)>0.
Therefore, V -T+ S(T, B) is also positive. Furthermore, V -T+ S(T, B) is independent of p.
Then,
k(Y0 —T)-pt/(8a2)= [Z* -T+ S(T, 9)]14)p
decreaseswith p, which implies that k decreases with p.
Thy inluilipu fui Ptupusiliuu 2' is the sunic as UIULiw nupuslLWu b, eA¼cptUIaL iui part
(iv) of the propositions. Under the alternative assumption about the implicit tax revenue, a higher
pç (premium of capital flight) or a lower a2 (risk of capital flight) reduces the amount of
domestic capital that the government can implicitly tax through financial repression. In order to
maintain the level of this source of revenue, the government has to increase the degree of
financial repression, which is positively related to capital control. Therefore, the government
responds to a higher p or a lower a2 by choosing a higher k.25
AppendixD: Data Documentation
1. We used two measures of Capital Control. The first one is a based on thepresence or absence
of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions in five categories defined in the IMF's Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), various issues.
Courtesy of Milesi-Ferretti for data op the last three of the five categories.
Multiple Exchange Rates: mulex
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998, IMF.
Dual or multiple exchange rates.
Assign 1 if the specified practice is a feature of the exchange system, 0 otherwise.
If missing replaced with 1995/96 data.
Payment Arrears or Bilateral Payment Arrangement: payarr & bipay
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998, IMF,
Arrangements for payments and receipts: payment arrears or bilateral payment arrangements.
Assign 1 if any of the specified practice is present, 0 otherwise.
If missing replaced with 1995/96data.
Controls on Payments for Invisible Transactions and Current Transfers: rescur
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictionsannual report 1997/1998, IMF.
Control on payments for invisible transactions and current transfers
Assign 1 if the specified practice is present for either items, 0 otherwise. If missing replaced with
1995/96data.
Controls on Proceeds from Exports and/or Invisible Transactions: resexp
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998, IMF.
Proceeds from exports andlor invisible transactions.
2 items: repatriation requirements, surrender requirements
Assign I if the specified practice is a feature of the exchange system for either items, 0
otherwise.
• Among the two items, if one if missing and the other one is 1, assign 1.
• Among the two items, if one is missing and the other is 0, assign 0, countries include:
Antigua and Barbuda
Controls on Capital Account Transactions: cap
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998, IMF.
Controls on capital transactions:
1997 has Controls on 11 items, 1996 has only the first 10 items.
I. Capital market securities
2. Money market instruments
3. Collective investment securities
4. Derivatives and other instruments
5. Commercial credits
6.Financialcredits
7. Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities26
8.Direct investment
9. Liquidation of direct investment
10. Real estate transactions
11. Personal capital movements
1997 data: Assign I for each item if the sum of the features>3, 0 otherwise. Treat as missing if
there are >4 missing categories.
If there are <=3 missing categories, we assign the most common ratings in the rest of the
categories to replace the missing values. These countries are: Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Belize,
Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Canieroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Columbia, Comoros, Congo, Rep. of, Costa Rica, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Gambia, Georgia, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania,
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Sit.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles,
Somalia, Sudan, Syrian, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe
1996 data: Only look at the first 10 items: Assign 1 for each item if the sum of features>3, 0
otherwise. Treat as missing if there are >4 missing values.
1995 andbefore:
Used the data on Southern Yemen (data closer to later data) for Yemen Rep.
Used the data on Belgium-Luxembourg for both Belgium and Luxembourg.
1991 and before:
Used the data on Czechoslovakia for Czech and Slovakia:
Used the data on former Yugoslavia for Yugoslavia, FDR;
Before 1989: Used the data on West Germany for Germany.
Second measure of Capital Control is more detailed coding of restrictions on close to
50 items of capital account transactions (together with a similarly detailed coding of current
account restrictions), computed by Natalia Tarnirisa for Tamirisa (1999) and Johnston and etc.
(1999),based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER), 1997. Courtesy of Natalia Tamirisa.
2. Measures of Corruption
ICRG Index
Corruption in Government from the International Country Risk Guide.
Bahamas, Malta, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, FR (Serb./Mont.): usd the data from 1986 for
1985; Bahamas, Burkina Faso, Congo, Rep., Gambia, The, Guinea-Bissau, Korea, Dem. Rep.,
Malta, Mongolia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Yemen, Rep., Yugoslavia, FR(Serb./Mont.), used the data
from 1985/86 for 1984. Original scale 0-6, Lower point totals indicate higher risk, rescale as 6 —
originalscore.27
TIIndex
Source: Transparency International (http://www.gwdg.de/-.'uwvw/jcr.htm), used 1998 index,
which will be the ranking for 1997.
Transparency International has adopted the approach of a composite index. It is a "poli of
polls'. It consists of credible surveys using different sampling frames and varying
methodologies. The 1998 CPI includes data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (Country Risk
Service arid Country Forecasts), Gallup International (50th Anniversary Survey), the Institute for
Management Development (World Competitiveness Yearbook), the Political & Economic Risk
Consultancy (Asian Intelligence Issue), the Political Risk Services (International Country Risk
Guide), World Development Report (Private Sector Survey) and the World Economic Forum
(Global Competitiveness Report), etc.. Note: TI has corruption indexes for earlier years as well.
However, the underlying methodology changes every year which makes inter-year comparison
misleading. We re-scaled the TI index by subtracting the original numbers from 10 so that a
large number implies more corruption.
GCRIndex
Source: Appendix to Kaufinann and Wei, "Does 'Grease Money' speed up the wheels of
commerce". NBER working paper 7093. Original source: Global competitiveness report 96, 97
GCR are surveys conducted by the World Economic Forum and Harvard Institute for
International Development for the 1996 and 1997 Global Competitiveness Reports, respectively.
GCR surveys are on 1-7 scales. Corruption rating for a country in this table is the average of all
individual responses for that country. In original surveys, a low number means more corruption,
the rating is re-scaled as S —originalrating. GCR97 is published in 1997 and the ranking is for
1996.
WDR Index
Source: Appendix to Kaufinann and Wei, "Does 'Grease Money' speed up the wheels of
commerce" NBER working paper 7093. Original source: 1997 World Development Report,
survey conducted by the World Bank for its 1997 World Development Report. The rating is then
for 1996.
WDR surveys are on 1-6 scales. Corruption rating for a country in this table is the
average of all individual responses for that country. In original surveys, a low number means
more corruption, the rating is re-scaled as 7 —originalrating.
3. Instrumental Variables for Corruption
Civil liberty and political freedom (1993)
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Freedom House Survey Team, 1993-1994
CIV is the abbreviation for civil liberties index. Liberties index measures the extent to
which people are able to express their opinion openly without fears of reprisals and are protected in
doing so by an independent judiciary. Though this index reflects rights to organize and
demonstrate as well as freedom of religion, education, travel and other personal rights; more
weight was given to those liberties that are most directly related to the expression of political
rights. This variable is an index and not in logs.28
POLis the abbreviation for political right index. Political rights index measures rights to
participate meaningfiully in the political process on a scale of one to seven where lower numbers
indicate greater political rights (see Gastil, 1989). A high ranking country must have a ffilly
operating electoral procedure, usually including a significant opposition vote. It is likely to have
had a recent change of government from one party to another, an absence of foreign domination,
decentralized political power and a consensus that allows all segments of the population some
power. The index was constructed on the basis of satisfaction of the above and other related criteria
by the countries in question. This variable is an index and not in logs.
Both Index range from 1 to 7. Smaller number means higher degree of freedom.
Democracy is defined as (7-civ)+(7-pol).
Corruption in JudicialSystem
Source, "lack of legal corruption," survey in 1996 for the Global Competitiveness Report 1997.
Question 8.09 Legal corruption, "Irregular payments to judges or other officials involved in the
enforcement and execution ofjudgements are not common and do not influence the outcome of
court proceedings" (lstrongly disagree, 7strongly agree).
Rescaled 7- original score Thus a smaller number means less corrupt judicial system.
4. Tax Evasion and Tax Rates
Tax Evasion
Source: survey (in 1996) for the Global Competitiveness Report 1997
2.10 Tax evasion, Tax evasion is minimal in your country. (lstrongly disagree, 7strongly
agree). Re-scaled as 7 -originalscore
Statutory Corporate Tax Rates
Courtesy of Altshuler for providing the data used in Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (1998)
Notes: 1. For Bermuda, effective tax rate was used instead of statutory rates. The statutory rate
for Bermuda was zero, but the effective rate was positive. 2. In some cases judgement was
made on the appropriate rate due to the presence of tax holidays.
5. Other Variables
Current Account Surplus
Source: World Bank SimaIGDF & WDI Central
Current account balance (% of GDP)1984-l997, in cross section regression used the average of
1984-96.
Government Consumption
Source: World Bank SimaJGDF & WDI Central
General government consumption (% of GDP)
1984-1997, in cross section regression used the average of 1984-96.
Government Debt
Source: World Bank SimaIGDF & WDI Central
Central government debt, total (Yo of GDP)30
Table Ia: Summary Statistics
Ok Mean Std. Dev. Mm Max
Aggregate capital control 1772.44 1.57 0 5
Currentaccountcontrols 40 0.13 0.10 0.010.33
Capital accountcontrols 40 0.38 0.30 0.010.95
Corruption—TI 84 5.10 2.41 0 8.6
Corruption—WDR 72 3.21 0.91 1 4.6
Corruption—ICRO 1222.57 1.28 0 6
Corruption—OCR 58 3.40 1,42 1.3 5.5
Legal Corruption—OCR 53 1.70 1.47 0 4.53
Democracy 1756.62 3.97 0 12
Note: Democracy is constructed by summing up the political rights and civillibertiesindexes.
Table Ib: Pairwise Correlation
Capital Controls Corruption Legal
aggregate CA KA TIWDR ICRO OCR Corruption
Current account control 0.78 1
Capital account control 0.88 0.83
Corruption -TI 0.58 0.53 0.52 1
Corruption WDR 0.62 0.55 0.65 0.86
Corruption -ICRG 0.44 0.49 0.43 0.85 0.55 1
Corruption -OCR 0.56 0.52 0.60 0.87 0.83 0.65 1
Legal corruption 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.89 0.77 0.80 0.80
Democracy -0.44 -0.57-0.49-0.68-0.50-0.66-0.57-0.6731
Table 2: BureaucraticCorruption and Capital Controls
DependentVariable =capital control
Specification Ordered probit Panel IV
Corruption measure TI 0CR97WDR97 ICRG96 ICRG 0CR97
Corruption 0.275" Ø44Ø**0.834"0,239"ØQ79**0.415"
(0.071) (0.129) (0.189) (0.101) (0.036) (0.183)
OECD -0.665"-0.747"-0.465-1.051"-2.180"-0.979"
(0,333) (0.344) (0.367) (0.307) (0.123) (0.401)
R2 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.29 0.16
No. ofObs 83 57 71 120 1629 51
1. White-robust standard errors in brackets. ,* and# denote significant at the 5%, 10% and the 15% levels,
respectively.
2. Pseudo R2 for ordered probit and IV regressions. Adjusted R2 for panel regression (LSDV, fixed effects with year
dummies).
3. Estimates on the constant and the cutoff parameters are not reported.
Table 3: Corruption and Capital Controls After Adding Regional Dummies
Dependent Variable =capitalcontrol
Specification ordered probit panel IV
Corruption measure T.[ GCR97WDR97ICRCi96 ICRG 0CR97
Corruption 0.308**0.501"0.880"0.210** 0.030 0539*1*
(0.074) (0.135) (0.201) (0.103) (0.035) (0.204)
OECD -0.795"-0.845"-0.309-1.078"-1.926"0.887**
(0.362) (0.394) (0.406) (0.321) (0.125) (0.432)
Sub-Sahara 0.090 0.906 0.515# 0.540*1* 0.857*1* 1.020
Africa (0.365) (0.807) (0.325) (0.269) (0.103) (0.820)
East Asia and -0.242 -0.257 0.302 -0.0300.820** -0.201
Pacific (0.373) (0.412) (0.546) (0.324) (0.128) (0.420)
Latin America -0.789" -0.498 -0.5970.5l9* 0.222*1* -0.402
(0.356) (0.444) (0.418)(0.289) (0.111) (0.529)
8.2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.35 0.18
No. of Obs 83 57 71 120 1629 5132
Table 4:Corruptionand CapitalControls with Additional Control Variables
DependentVariable: capital control
Specification ordered probit Panel IV
Corruption measure TI OCR,1CR096ICRO ICRO OCR OCR
Corruption 0.567" 2.49!"0.723**0.124# 0.110* 0.8100.821"
(0.175)(0.994)(0.306)(0.083)(0.067)(0.489)(0.396)
Current Account 0.037 -0.052 -0.0080.0S7** .0,020**-0,183#-0.072
Balance/GDP (0.064)(0.188)(0.060)(0.018)(0.009)(0.117)(0.095)
Government 0.146"0.459" 0.084-0.085"0016 0.099 O.131#
ConsumptionioDP (0.071)(0.203)(0.061)(0.024)(0.024)(0.092)(0.086)
Government -0.013"-0.017.0.011**-0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
Debt/ODP (0.006)(0.0 13)(0.006)(0.002)(0.002)(0.008)(0.008)
Inflation -0.001 -0,004 -0.0010.0l0**-0.0003-0.002 -0.002
(0.001)(0004)(0.001)(0.002)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)




OECD -0.963 -0.931-1.546" -1.669" -[.134
(0.691)(1.462)(0.639)(0.290) (0.856)
Sub-Sahara 0.374 -0.043 -0.067
Africa (0.769) (0.704)(0.285)
East Asia and -0.513 -1.169.1.212*2.789** .1.720*
Pacific (0.760)(1.434)(0.721)(0.238) (0.909)
Latin America -0.601 0.514 -1.048-1.708" -1.851
(0.919)(1.595)(0.899)(0.357) (1.380)
R2 0.39 0.66 0.33 0.65 0.13 0.36 0.29
No. ofObs 32 25 33 167 167 25 25
Panel 1: LSDV with year dummies. Panel 2: country random effects with year dummies. Also see footnotes to
Table 2.33
Table 5: Effect of a Rise in Corruption on Capital Controls
P0 P1 P2 P3 P4 PS
(Based on the last regression in Table 3)
Corruption =4.3(e.g. Ukrain) 0.130.260.150.310.100.04
Corruption =1.6(e.g. Singapore) 0.640.250.060.050.010.00
(Based on the second to the last regression
in Table 4)
Corruption =4.3 (e.g. Ukrain) 0.040.280.340.330.010.00
Corruption =1.6(e.g. Singapore) 0.680.280.040,000.000.00
Note: P0, P1P5 denote the probability that the aggregate capital control index =0,1 5, respectively.
average values for explanatory variables other than corruption.
Table 6: More Detailed Coding of Current Account Restrictions
Dept. Variable: current account control
TI OCR WDR ICRO GCRIV
Corruption 0.006 0.016** 0.003 0.008 0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.038) (0.013) (0.009)
OECD 0.l24**0.l19**-0.142"-0.123"0.I25**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.067) (0.027) (0.024)
Sub-Sahara -0.0370.101" -0.053 -0.023 0.098"
Africa (0.103) (0.021) (0.118) (0.103) (0.021)
East Asia and 0.001 -0.001 -0.015 0.006 0.002
Pacific (0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.026) (0.023)
Latin America -0.036 -0.011 -0.024 -0.032 -0.011
(0.051) (0.056) (0.022) (0.052) (0.055)
p-value forFlausmantest 0.99
p-value for test 0.06
of overidentification
0.52 0.65 0.55 0.46 0.65
No. ofObs 38 32 21 37 32
Note: For the Hausman test, Ho: the differences in the coefficients from the OLS and IV regressions are not
systematic. For the overidentification test, Ho: E[residuals *instruments]=0.White-robust standard errors in
brackets.
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Table 7:MoreDetailed Codingof CapitalAccount Restrictions
Dept.Variable:capital account control
TI (3CR WDR ICRO GCRIV
Corruption 0.032#0.078" 0.160 0.016 ØØg3*
(0.021) (0.037) (0.107)(0.034) (0.041)
OECD 0.268**. -0.275"-0.170-0.335"0.269**
(0.111) (0.102) (0.229) (0.093) (0.102)
Sub-Sahara -0.203 0.033 -0.115 -0.199 0.035
Africa (0.205) (0.077) (0.336) (0.184) (0.076)
EastAsiaazid 0.038 0.006 0.167 0.037 0.004
Pacific (0.086) (0.088) (0.170) (0.093) (0.083)
Latin America -0.066 0.014 0.046 -0.077 0.013
(0.164) (0.169) (0.083)(0.159) (0.169)
p-value for test 0.74
of overidentification
0.40 0.55 0.47 0.37 0.55
No. of Ohs 38 32 21 37 32
Table 8: Corruptionand Tax Evasion
Dept. Variable: tax evasion
Measure of
Corruption TI TI GCR OCRWDR WDR
legal
Corruption
legal
corruption
Corruption 0.33Y*
(0.035)
0.374" Q•597** 0.613"
(0.046)(0.071)(0.084)
0.834** 0.841**
(0.182)(0.188)
0.505"
(0.071)
0.497"
(0.095)
Statutorytax3.313"
Rate (1.164)
2.719" 3534**3397**
(1.101)(0.995)(1.017)
4.810" 4.776"
(1.060)(1.211)
4799**
(1.216)
4.852"
(1.154)
OECD 0.320 0.080
(0.237) (0.243)
0.027
(0.3 18)
-0.041
(0.293)
R2 0.7
No.of Cbs 42
0.71 0.7 0.7
42 42 42
0.74 0.74
23 23
0.61
42
0.61
42